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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL MILK MARKETING SYSTEM AND AN
ANALYTICAL VIEW OF UNIQUE QUALITIES EFFECTS ON MILK PRICES IN
THE SOUTHEAST
The Southeast Order has been milk deficit for over ten years and because of this milk has
to be brought in from other orders to meet processor’s demand. Transportation credits
provide processors with help to cover transportation costs to bring outside milk into the
order. To help keep Class I utilization and support milk prices, relative to orders in the
North, Order 7 has low diversion limits. As milk produced within Order 7 has been on a
downward trend, milk brought into the order has not increased as consistently. In 2000
milk pooled from farms within the order made up an average of 66% out of the total
amount pooled compared to a 2012 average of 43%. The objectives of this paper are to
review the history of the federal milk marketing system, describe the structure of milk
pricing, examine the unique features of the southern orders, and estimate the impact of
the amount of milk diverted and the amount paid in transportation credits on Order 7’s
uniform price. The results showed that only Class II diverted pounds had a statistically
significant impact on the uniform price.
Keywords: Diversion limits, transportation credits, federal milk marketing orders, panel
data, Southeast Order
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Diversions have recently become a point of contention for the Appalachian and Southeast
Orders, also known as Order 5 and Order 7, respectively. Diversions are a limit placed on
the amount of pooled milk that a pool plant may divert to a non-pool plant and still be
pooled on an order. In 2014 there was a request for the diversion limits in the Southeast
Order to be lowered to 0%, but that request was denied (USDA-AMS, Florida and
Southeast Marketing Areas, Combined Comments, 2014). Since the Southeast Order has
a “milk deficit” status, milk producers who pool their milk on the order perceive
diversions as putting downward pressure on the milk price they receive. Both the
Appalachian and Southeast Orders have diversion limits of 25% during the months of
July through November and January through February. The months December and March
through June have a limit of 35%. The diversion limits for the Appalachian and Southeast
Orders can be viewed in their federal order language (USDA-AMS, Historical
Documents) There is a need and purpose for diversions, but what is the appropriate
percentage of diversions to be beneficial to both producers and processors?

Transportation credits are another point of contention for dairy farmers who pool their
milk on Order 7. Transportation credits date back to 1996 and are an assessment rate on
each hundredweight of milk classified for fluid use that is received or handled by a
regulated plant. The assessment rate then goes into a fund, and processors/handlers can
apply for the credits to help cover transportation costs associated with bringing in
supplemental milk from outside of the order’s regional boundaries. These credits are
1

currently only active in the Appalachian and Southeast Orders. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that farmers believe they are paying for the transportation credits out of their
milk check since the processors/handlers have to pay into the transportation credit
balancing fund. Since the Southeast Order is a milk deficit region, transportation credits
were established to help processors and handlers with the transportation costs of bringing
in milk from outside the order’s regional boundaries. The transportation credits have not
been formally asked to be removed, but their effect on Order 7’s uniform price, like
diversion limits, is unknown.

This study focuses on how both the amount of milk diverted into lower classes (any class
other than Class I) and the sum of money paid to processors/handlers for transportation
credits affect the Southeast Order’s uniform (or blend) price. The uniform price and blend
price are the same and will be used interchangeably throughout this study. The original
intent was to focus on both the Appalachian and Southeast orders, but because of a
difference in data availability between the orders, this was not possible. However,
because of the similarities between the Southern orders the research findings should have
implications for the Appalachian, Florida, and Southeast Orders.

Since the Southeast Order is a milk deficit region, it is hypothesized that lowering
diversion limits, which will reduce the amount of milk diverted into lower classes, will
help to increase the blend price by increasing Class I utilization. The second hypothesis is
that transportation credits have a negative effect on uniform price because they encourage
processors/handlers to bring in excess amounts of milk from outside the order, which can
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then be diverted into lower classes of milk. This study will test that theory by looking at
whether the pounds of milk diverted into Classes II, III, and IV cause the order’s uniform
price to decrease and then looking at the impact of the dollars paid for transportation
credits on Order 7’s uniform price.

The structure of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 1 provides an overview of the federal
milk marketing order. Chapter 2 discusses the history of federal milk marketing more
extensively and details the way classes of milk are priced. Chapter 3 describes how the
Southern milk marketing orders are unique. Chapter 4 provides analytical models that
detail the effects of diversions and transportation credits on the uniform price, and
Chapter 5 summarizes the conclusions and implications of the discussion and research
presented in this paper.

1.1 Federal Milk Marketing Order History
The history of the federal milk marketing orders (FMMOs) is a long one that has gone
through many transformations since the orders were first organized. The purpose of the
orders is to provide market stability for both milk producers and processors due to milk’s
perishability and seasonal fluctuations. Additionally, there was a desire to strengthen the
bargaining position of producers against handlers (Christensen, 1978). The start of
FMMOs began in 1933 with the Agricultural Adjustment Act that granted the federal
government authority to regulate the handling of milk. The order language for the
FMMOs was first developed in 1937 by the Agricultural Marketing Act (Figure 1). As
time has gone by, the FMMOs have added a new class of milk (Class IV) with the
3

Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000 and incorporated transportation credits in some
orders. There have also been dramatic changes in the way the milk price is calculated.
From the 1960s to 1995 the Minnesota-Wisconsin (M-W) price determined milk pricing,
but in 1995 the Basic Formula Price (BFP) was used, and then in 2000 Multiple
Component Pricing (MCP) became the new standard formula.

Federal Milk Marketing Order Timeline
1933 – Agricultural Adjustment Act
Gave federal authority to regulate the handling of milk
1937 – Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act
Authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to issue milk
orders
1996 – Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act (
Instructed the Secretary of Agriculture to consolidate
the number of milk orders to between 10 and 14
2000 – Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000
Consolidated the number of federal orders from 31 to
11, replaced the basic formula price (BFP) with a new
milk price formula, and created a new class of milk
(Class IV)
Figure 1. Federal Milk Marketing Order Timeline

The Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937 addressed some commodities, but a primary
focus of the law discussed regulating milk and milk products. Interestingly, the word
“diversion” is not written anywhere within the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of
1937. Since 1937, the number of orders has varied; there were 83 orders at one time in
1962 (Christensen, 1978). As transportation costs have decreased and milk hauling has
become more efficient, milk distribution has widened, which in effect has decreased the
need for a large number of marketing orders. A 2014 study showed that the transportation
credits were having the intended effect by encouraging the movement of milk from low
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to high utilization markets (Seo & McCarl, 2014). The orders have also shifted from
being centered around cities to becoming regionally based.

Figure 2. Change in Federal Milk Marketing Orders After Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 2000 (Cropp, 2001)

It seems most transformations to the orders have happened more recently. The 1996 Farm
Bill (Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996) encouraged the
Secretary of Agriculture to consolidate the 31 orders to between 10 and 14, and the
Secretary came back with a recommendation of 11 milk marketing orders. Once the
federal milk marketing orders were consolidated there were a total of 11 orders.
However, the Western FMMO, which consisted of Utah and parts of Nevada, Idaho, and
Oregon, was terminated in April 2004, reducing the number of orders to 10 which is
where it has stayed for over 10 years 1. The difference between the original 31 orders and
the present 10 orders is striking in some areas and has no difference in others. The
Southeast Order (Order 7) and Pacific Northwest Order (Order 124) are two whose
marketing areas are very similar to their originals. The current Central Order (Order 32)

1.

The Western FMMO, Order 135, was terminated because a set of proposed changes was voted on,
and because the changes did not get 2/3 of the vote the order was dissolved.

5

had consisted of over six different orders before it was consolidated. Additionally, the
Appalachian Order (Order 5) is a marketing area that was originally made up of two
orders and some non-order area. Order 5 now covers all of North Carolina, South
Carolina, and the majority of Kentucky, and the eastern side of Tennessee. The changes
in the federal orders after the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000 can be viewed
above in Figure 2.

1.2 The Classification of Milk
As the orders have changed, so has the classification of milk. The Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2000 added a fourth class of milk when there were originally three.
Classes of Milk
Pre Consolidated Appropriations Act
Post Consolidated Appropriations Act
Class I – Fluid Use
Class I – Fluid use
Class II – Soft manufacturing products
Class II – Soft manufacturing products
Class III – Hard manufacturing products
Class III – Cheese
Class IV – Butter and dry milk
Table 1. The Classes of Milk Pre and Post Consolidated Appropriations Act

As can be seen from Table 1 detailing the pre and current classes of milk, the main
change resulting from the Consolidated Appropriations Act was that Class III was
divided into two classes separating cheese from butter and dry milk. Along with different
classes of milk, there are different grades of milk: Grades A and B. Grade A milk has
stricter sanitary standards so that it can be used for fluid milk, and because Grade B milk
has less stringent standards it is only able to be used in manufacturing products. By 1999,
however, 97% of U.S. milk met Grade A standards (Sumner & Balagtas, 2002).
6

Since most U.S. milk is Grade A, the grade is not as much of an issue. Classification of
Milk is a crucial part of milk orders though since the class is a component of milk price
discovery. Each order has different class utilizations depending on what type of milk
processors are located within a region and how much milk they each individually process.
The Midwest Order (Order 30), for example, is dominated by manufacturing plants, such
as cheese and thus has the lowest Class I utilization of any order. Due to the high volume
of manufacturing plants, the milk that is pooled in the Midwest Order has a very highClass III utilization often over 80% (USDA-AMS, Federal Milk Marketing Order
Marketing and Utilization Summary). The Appalachian and Southeast Orders both have
high Class I utilizations because the processors within that region are mostly fluid milk
plants. The Appalachian, Southeast, and Florida Orders have the largest Class I
utilization out of the 10 orders with utilization consistently above 60%. Most other milk
orders, except the Midwest Order, range from 20-40% for their Class I utilization. Class I
milk is priced the highest out of the four which allows the Southern orders to have a
relatively higher blend price. Class II typically follows Class I with the second highest
price. While the Class IV price is usually the lowest, occasionally, the Class III milk has
a lower price.

1.3 Class I Differentials
Many parts of the federal milk marketing orders are integral to the current regulatory
system. An important part to discuss is the Class I differentials, which are also known as
location differentials. The goal of the Class I differentials is to “generate sufficient
7

revenue to assure an adequate supply of milk while maintaining equity among handlers in
the minimum prices they pay for milk bought from dairy farmers (USDA-AMS, Class I
Pricing Structure).” Simply put, Class I differentials attempt to ensure an adequate supply
of milk wherever a plant is located.

When the Secretary of Agriculture consolidated the 33 milk orders in 2000 to 11 orders,
the marketing areas for each order understandably changed. This consolidation also
altered the Class I differentials, which is why an adjusted Class I pricing structure was
developed with the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000. There were two options to
set the Class I differentials: option 1A, which focused on location, and option 1B, which
focused on relative value. Option 1A is the option that Congress approved even though
the Secretary of Agriculture recommended Option 1B. Option 1A is “location-specific
Class I differentials reflecting the relative economic value of milk by location (USDAAMS, Class I Pricing Structure).” An important part of Class I differentials is that they
differ by county. This means that a dairy producer who ships their milk to a processing
plant in County A and their neighbor who sends their milk to a plant in County B could
receive a different price for their milk if the Class I differential is higher in County A
than B.

1.4 Milk Deficit Orders
Since Option 1A focused on location and economic value the Class I differentials are
comparably higher in the Florida, Appalachian, and Southeast orders. This option also
included a component that reflected “regional differences of fluid and manufacturing
8

milk (USDA-AMS, Class I Pricing Structure).” Within these southern orders along with a
high Class I utilization and there is also a milk deficit. All three orders have been milk
deficit since the FMMOs were consolidated from 33 orders to 11 (USDA,Marketing
Service Bulletin, 2002). The term “milk deficit” refers to a region’s inability to meet milk
demand and having to meet pool distributing plant demand by bringing in milk from out
of the area. Transportation credits and a higher blend price in Orders 5 & 7 help to attract
milk from outside of the area to meet processors milk demand. However, as consumer’s
demand for fluid milk continues to decrease, Class I utilization will also drop, meaning
that the blend price could fall low enough to potentially force out small dairy farms
within Orders 5 & 7. The decline in fluid milk sales in the Southeast order’s uniform milk
price is displayed in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. U.S. Fluid Milk Sales and Southeast Uniform Price (USDA-ERS, Dairy
Data; USDA-AMS, Florida and Southeast Marketing Areas)
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1.5 Milk Pricing
The blend price can be calculated one of two ways depending on the order. If a producer
sends their milk to an order that uses skim-fat pricing, then the blend price will be the
same as the uniform price (not including premiums). However, a majority of orders
within the federal milk marketing system use Multiple Component Pricing (MCP). The
difference between skim-fat pricing and MCP can be seen below in Table 2. There are
currently four orders out of the ten that do not use MCP, and those are Order 5, 6, 7, and
131 (Arizona Order). The MCP system bases the milk price on pounds of proteins,
butterfat, and other solids. Essentially, the MCP rewards producers who make highquality milk by paying them a higher milk price. One could also assume that producers
who do not produce high-quality milk are either forced to produce better quality milk or
leave the dairy industry. The current pricing formulas can be found in the appendix.

Skim-Fat Pricing

Multiple Component Pricing

Handlers:
Pay for pounds of butterfat and skim for
all classes

Handlers:
Pay for pounds of butterfat (all classes),
Class I pounds of skim, Class II pound of
nonfat solids, Class III pounds of protein
and other solids, Class IV pounds of
nonfat solids

Producers:
Producers:
Are paid for pounds of butterfat and
Are paid for pounds of butterfat, protein,
skim of the weighted average of all four
other solids, any residual value
classes
Table 2. Skim-Fat Pricing vs. Multiple Component Pricing
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1.6 Appalachian and Southeast Milk Marketing Orders
Both the Appalachian and Southeast orders have a Transportation Credit Balancing Fund.
This transportation fund automatically accumulates $0.15 for the Appalachian order and
$0.30 for the Southeast Order per hundredweight of designated fluid use milk that a
handler receives or handles (USDA-AMS, A Primer on Federal Order Transportation
Credits, 2010). The fund is then available for processors to use to aid with their
transportations costs that were incurred transporting in supplemental milk in the case that
the marketing area is not able to sufficiently meet the processor's milk demand.

Due to the Appalachian and Southeast orders having been milk deficit for multiple years,
the high Class I differentials and transportation credits were and are used as incentives to
increase the milk supply. These two orders struggle to maintain a high blend price and
meet market area milk demand simultaneously. Within both of these orders, there is a
one-day delivery requirement per month. The delivery day requirement means that an out
of area producer needs to only supply one day of milk production within either of those
orders to qualify for the higher blend price for the rest of the month. An important note is
that a producer who takes their milk to more than one order will automatically qualify for
the order with the higher blend price. The one-day delivery requirement is good for the
out of area producers who might be in an area that has more manufacturing plants such as
cheese plants and would, therefore, receive a lower price for their milk if they stayed
within their order the whole month. However, this has a potentially adverse effect on the
blend price for all producers who have their milk processed within the Appalachian and
11

Southeast orders. For example, an out of order producer who only delivers one day a
month to a regulated plant in Order 7 can have their milk be pooled on Order 7. That
producer’s milk can then take his/her milk the rest of the month to a non-pool plant and
still receive the pooled high blend price. Since this milk is from another area, meaning
they’re from within another order, the chances of this producer having their milk be
processed for a class other than Class I is higher than if all of the out of order producer’s
milk came to Order 7. The out of area milk from this producer that is taken to non-pool
plant will then be pooled on Order 7 and has a high chance of lowering the Class I
utilization, which then consequently reduces the blend price as well.

1.7 Delivery Day Requirements
The delivery day requirements vary by order. The Florida Order, for example, has a tenday delivery day requirement. By requiring that producers have to deliver ten days worth
of milk to a plant within the marketing area, the Florida order is ensuring that the out of
order milk is processed in a plant that has a higher chance of being a fluid milk
processing plant. The stringent delivery day requirement keeps their Class I utilization
high, and therefore the blend price relatively high as well. Florida is an outlier among
other orders when it comes to delivery day requirements. Most orders have a one-delivery
requirement. The delivery day requirement may be temporarily increased or decreased by
the market administrator if an investigation, which can be prompted by the administrator
or an individual, finds that change is needed (USDA-AMS, Order Regulating the
Handling of Milk in the Southeast Marketing Area, 2014).

12

The delivery day requirement can be a point of contention between producers and
processors. However, the diversion limit is a regulation that can be even more of concern
for producers. Like delivery day requirements, diversion limits vary from order to order
and can be temporarily adjusted by the market administrator of each order. The market
administrator can change the diversion limits temporarily, but a proposal to change the
diversion limits permanently must pass “either two-thirds of the dairy farmers voting or
producers representing two-thirds of the milk that would have been pooled during a
designated month must approve” the change (USDA-AMS, Questions and Answers on a
Potential Proposal for a California Federal Milk Marketing Order, 2015).” Diversion
limits are often higher in the fall and winter months when supply is heavier, and demand
is lower compared to lower diversion limits in the spring and summer months where
supply is lower, and demand is higher. The lower diversion limits in the spring and
summer are to ensure that there is a sufficient supply of milk within the order. Diversions
can be a complicated matter but described simply it is the amount of milk that can be
delivered directly from a farm to a non-pool plant but still pooled on the order and qualify
for the blend price (Figure 4).

13

What is a non-pool plant?*
A non-pool plant is a plant that is:
1. Fully regulated by another
Federal order
2. Producer-handler plant
3. Partially regulated distributing
plant
4. Unregulated supply plant
5. An exempt plant
What is a pool plant?
A pool plant is a fully regulated plant
that is:
1. A distributing plant
2. A supply plant
3. A plant within the marketing
area operated by a coop
4. Two or more plants operated
by the same handler and
within the same marketing
area
For full definitions refer to order
language ((USDA-AMS, Order
Regulating the Handling of Milk in
the Southeast Marketing Area, 2014)
*These definitions have been
simplified.
Figure 4. Pool and Non-Pool Plant Definitions

Diversion limits can have different effects on an order depending on the order’s current
milk status. In 2005 there was a hearing held to determine if Order 33, the Mideast Order,
should lower their diversion limits from 60% to 50% from August to February and 70%
to 60% from March to July. There were some that were concerned that lowering these
diversion rates would cause the cooperatives within the area to gain an even larger share
of the market share (Cotterill, 2005). However, other witnesses supported amending the
diversion limits to get a better understanding of the market’s Class I needs and to prevent
14

out of area producers from lowering the order’s blend price. Order 33 is an order that is
not a milk deficit area, unlike Orders 5, 6, and 7. The concern that out of area pooling
will lower Class I utilization and therefore reduce the blend price is a mutual concern
among the four orders: 5, 6, 7, and 33. As mentioned earlier, this is why the Florida Order
has such high delivery day requirements. Due to Orders 5 and 7 having a different milk
status than Order 33, the impacts of lowering the diversion limits could potentially be
different. A milk deficit status means that all of the milk produced within the marketing
area needs to stay in the area and plants should preferably only be bringing in milk that is
needed. While Orders 5 and 7 have the lowest diversion limits out of all the orders,
except Florida, they are still struggling within producing enough milk to supply
processors demands. Milk that is coming from out of the area from places such as Texas
or Illinois only has to deliver one day worth of milk to Orders 5 or 7, where the milk
could be diverted into a lower class, to be pooled on Order 5 or 7.

The issues of diversions is not a simple task to explain. However, because their impact on
producers within an order is unknown, it is important to attempt to quantify what is
potential effect on price. The next few chapters will go into more detail about the history
of the federal milk marketing orders and what makes the southern orders unique.
Additionally, Chapter 4 will take an analytical look at the impact of both diversions and
transportation credits on Order 7’s uniform price.
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Chapter 2: The History and Class Pricing of Federal Milk Marketing Orders

The regulation of milk is an important part of the development of the milk industry, and
an understanding of the history of milk regulation is critical to understanding the pros and
cons of the current industry. Additionally, to understand milk pricing, it is important to
understand the history of the federal milk marketing orders. This chapter will provide
information on how milk became regulated and how the class pricing system works. A
glossary (Appendix 1) is provided at the end for reference.

2.1 Background
In 1933, the Agricultural Adjustment Act gave the federal government the authority to
regulate the handling of milk. The Agricultural Marketing Agreement of 1937 then gave
the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to issue marketing orders, and one of those
marketing orders was for milk. The Federal Milk Marketing Orders (FMMOs) have
evolved considerably since they were authorized in 1937.

Initially, the marketing orders were designed to coordinate the supply and demand of
milk. Since milk is a perishable commodity regional boundaries were established to help
ensure that milk produced could meet demand from local economies. Both technology
and transportation have improved over the last 80 years, and this has allowed regional
boundaries to expand. The milk marketing orders have consolidated to as low as 10
orders, as of 2016, and under these 10 milk marketing orders roughly “60 percent of all
milk marketed in the United States is marketed… (Federal Milk Marketing Orders,
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Section 10 Review, 2015).” Roughly, one-fifth of the remaining 40% of milk marketed
comes from California (California Milk Advisory Board, 2016). The figure below shows
the current regional boundaries of the 10 FMMOs (Figure 5), and the table below (Table
3) details the names and number of each milk marketing order.

Figure 5. Map of Federal Milk Marketing Orders

Federal Milk Marketing Orders
Order 1
Northeast
Order 5
Appalachian
Order 6
Florida
Order 7
Southeast
Order 30
Upper Midwest
Order 32
Central
Order 33
Mideast
Order 124
Pacific Northwest
Order 126
Southwest
Order 131
Arizona
Table 3. List of Federal Milk Marketing Orders
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The current orders were shaped by the 1996 Farm Bill, also known as the Federal
Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996. This bill required the
Secretary of Agriculture to reduce the 31 milk marketing orders to between 10 and 14.
The Secretary initially consolidated the orders to 11 under the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2000. In 2004 the Western FMMO – Utah, and parts of Nevada,
Idaho, and Oregon – was terminated, which is why there are currently only 10 Orders.
The full federal milk marketing order timeline can be viewed below in Figure 6.

Consolidated the number of federal
orders from 31 to 11, replaced the
basic formula price (BFP) with a new
milk price formula, and created a new
class of milk (Class IV)
Consolidated Appropriations Act of
2000

Authorized the Secretary of
Agriculture to issue milk
orders
Agricultural Marketing Act

1937

2000

1996

1933

FAIR Act
Instructed the Secretary of
Agriculture to consolidate
the number of milk orders
to between 10 and 14

Agricultural Adjustment Act
Gave federal authority to
regulate the handling of milk

Figure 6. Federal Milk Marketing Order Timeline

2.2 Class Pricing
Originally, there were only three classes of milk, but after the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2000, the third class of milk was divided up into Class III and IV.
These four classes of milk are:
Class I – fluid milk
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Class II – Soft manufacturing products (ice cream, cottage cheese, etc.)
Class III – Hard cheese and cream cheese
Class IV – Butter and dry milk.

Each of the four classes of milk has a specific pricing formula that is calculated using a
set of component prices (see Appendix 1). Class I and II have advanced pricing and are
“based on the previous month’s end product pricing (McCullock, 2011).” Class I
incorporates the higher of the advanced Class III, and IV skim milk prices. Advanced
prices are based on the first two weeks of the preceding month. The Class II formula uses
the advanced Class IV skim milk price. For example, Class III pricing uses the
components of other solids, protein, and butterfat, while Class IV uses butterfat and
nonfat solids as can be seen below (USDA-AMS, Current Price Formulas).

The Class III and IV prices are determined using three steps (Jesse & Cropp, 2008). The
first stage of formulating the Class III and IV price involves setting prices for milk
components – butterfat, protein, nonfat milk solids, and other milk solids – by developing
product price formulas. Jesse and Cropp (2008) describe the product price formula as:

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
=�
−
� 𝑥𝑥 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
Breaking that formula up, there are three important parts: product price, make allowance,
and yield. The product price is the monthly average of the wholesale prices for each
product – cheese, dry whey, butter, and nonfat dry milk (Jesse & Cropp, 2008). The
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cheese component of the product price is specifically the wholesale prices of block and
barrel cheddar cheese, and butter is Grade AA butter (Jesse & Crop, 2008). The second
part of the product price, the make allowance, is the estimated manufacturing cost per
pound and is determined through a survey of processors’ costs. The current make
allowance for butter, for example, is $0.1715 (Class III butterfat price formula below)
(Stephenson, 2007), which suggests that it costs roughly 17 cents to make one pound of
butter.

𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 – 0.1715) 𝑥𝑥 1.211.
Lastly, the yield factor estimates how much of a product can be produced from one pound
of a component. For example, from the Class III butter price formula the yield factor for
butter is 1.211. This suggests that one pound of butterfat (the component) can yield 1.211
pounds of butter (the product). After the component prices have been determined, stage
one has been completed.

In the second stage, the skim milk price is determined using the component prices that
were previously discussed. Since a hundredweight of Class IV skim milk has been
calculated to “contain 9 pounds of nonfat milk solids”, Class IV skim milk price is as
follows:

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑥𝑥 9
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The skim milk prices for Class III and IV are important because they are also part of
Class I and II pricing formulas. Class II uses the advanced Class IV skim milk price to
help determine Class II skim milk price, and Class I uses the higher of the advanced
Class III or IV skim milk price to as part of the Class I skim milk price.

The third and final stage in determining the Class III and IV prices is dependent on
butterfat content. The Class III butterfat component price that was derived in the first
stage is used with the Class III skim milk price that was discussed in the second stage to
come up with the final Class III and IV prices. The Class IV price also uses the Class III
butterfat price to determine its final price. Figure 3 below shows applicable pricing
formulas for all four classes of milk.
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𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 𝑰𝑰:

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥 0.965) + (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥 3.5).
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
= 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓
+ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑.
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
= 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓
+ (𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 100).

𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰:

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥 0.965) + (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥 3.5).
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + $0.70.
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + $0.007.
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 =

𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰:

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
.
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𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥 0.965) + (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥 3.5).
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥 3.1) + (𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥 5.9).
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = ((𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 – 0.2003) 𝑥𝑥 1.383)
+ ((((𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒 – 0.2003) 𝑥𝑥 1.572) – 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥 0.9) 𝑥𝑥 1.17).
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 – 0.1991) 𝑥𝑥 1.03.
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 – 0.1715) 𝑥𝑥 1.211.

𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰:

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥 0.965) + (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥 3.5).
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥 9.
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 − 0.1678) 𝑥𝑥 0.99.
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼.

Figure 7. Current Pricing Formulas (USDA-AMS, Current Price Formulas)

Class utilization refers to the share of milk that is processed in each class. Regions with a
relatively low level of milk production will see a larger proportion of their milk sold for
fluid use and areas with relatively higher milk production will see more of their milk sold
into the lower classes. For example, 70% Class 1 utilization would mean that 70% of the
milk is processed as Class I, meaning it is processed for fluid consumption. Since the
Appalachian, Florida, and Southeast Orders are milk-deficit orders, more of the milk
produced is processed as Class I for these regions. The Upper Midwest Order, Order 30,
has minimal Class I utilization compared to the Southern orders, as can be seen in Table
4 below.
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2016 Class I Utilization
Appalachian Southeast Florida Upper Midwest
Jan
70.46
72.83
84.57
9.14
Feb
69.8
73.25
83.37
9.16
Mar
67.23
65.61
84.37
9.44
Apr
66.02
64.29
84.48
8.88
May
63.96
64.46
81.11
8.85
June
64.84
64.79
83.56
8.64
July
67.84
68.71
83.32
9.53
Aug
74.23
80.98
84.14
13.2
Sept
74.07
78.91
87.88
12.54
Oct
70.57
74.29
83.09
10.24
Nov
75.09
78.81
83.14
15.74
Dec
71.53
71.64
83.24
14.5
Table 4. 2016 Class I Utilization Percentages (USDA-AMS, 2016 Class
I Utilization Percentage of Producer Milk, 2016)

The Upper Midwest Order, for example, has a high Class III utilization, given a large
number of cheese processing plants located within the order. Florida has the largest Class
I utilization because a majority of their pool plants process Class I milk and the order has
very low diversion limits compared to the rest of the orders. Florida’s diversion limits, set
between 10% and 20% depending on the month, limit excess milk being pooled on the
order. This prevention of excess amount of milk means a lower amount of milk will be
potentially diverted into a lower class of milk which would lower the Class I utilization.
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Diversion Limits
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Figure 8. Diversion Limits (USDA-AMS, Diversion Limit)

Diversions are excess milk that is not needed at a pool plant, so it is diverted to a nonpool plant. Each order is allowed a certain percentage of the total amount of pooled milk
to divert, which can be seen from Figure 8. Two relevant points of time circled in Figure
4 represent changes in diversion limits. The circle on the left highlights when the
diversion limits were lowered for the Florida Order from diversion limits of 20%, 25%,
and 40% to 10%, 15%, and 20%. The second circle on the right side of Figure 4 depicts
the 2008 lowering of the Appalachian and Southeast Orders diversion limits. This change
also created consistent limits between the two orders. For the southern orders – the
Appalachian, Florida, and Southeast – the lower the diversion limits, the less likely milk
will be utilized for a class other than Class I.

Class I differentials were intended to encourage the movement of milk from high supply
areas to low supply areas. The differentials were meant to approximate estimated
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transportation costs from these high supply areas to the low supply areas (Jesse & Cropp,
2008). Under the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000, there was an alteration of
Class I differentials. Currently, the federal milk marketing order system has locationspecific Class I differentials. These differentials focus on location and economic value.
Orders that are milk deficit – like the Appalachian, Florida, and Southeast Orders – have
higher Class I differentials than most other regulated areas. These differentials can differ
by county. Two producers that are under the same milk marketing order and live in the
same county can receive different prices for their milk if they happen to deliver to plants
that are located in different counties because of the Class I differential.

Due to Class I differentials being included in the Class I price, milk that is sold for fluid
use will net the highest price per hundredweight. Typically, Class II prices will be the
second highest price and Class III, and IV prices can vary behind Class I and II. The
blend price is a weighted average price for all milk that is sold. So, the more milk that is
sold into higher classes, the higher the blend price will be. For this reason, blend prices
are higher in regions where Class I utilization is higher. Diversions are important because
they have the potential to impact class utilizations. Every pound of excess milk that is
pooled on the order has the potential to be used for Class II, III, or IV, which could lower
the blend price. This is especially true in the south where Class I utilization is typically
higher.

Beyond the uniform price, the term mailbox price is often used in milk marketing.
Similar to blend prices, mailbox prices can differ based on which order a producer pools
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their milk on. The term pooled means an order’s total amount of milk that was received at
a regulated pool plant. Pooled milk is eligible to receive federal order milk pricing. There
are types of plants other than pool plants, but only pool plants are regulated by an order.
Pooling can impact class utilization which then can impact the blend price that milk
producers will receive in an order.

The blend price is the price based on how much milk was used in each class of milk that
was pooled in an order. However, while the blend price should be the same for all
producers, the amount that producers actually receive will be impacted by the Class I
differential and other costs. These other costs are incorporated into the mailbox price.
The term mailbox price can be “defined as the net price received by dairy farmers for
milk, including all payments received for milk sold and deducting costs associated with
marketing the milk. All payments for milk sold include: over-order premiums; quality,
component, breed, and volume premiums; payouts from state-run over-order pricing
pools; payments from superpool organizations or marketing agencies in common;
payouts from programs offering seasonal production bonuses; and, monthly distributions
of cooperative earnings (USDA-AMS, Mideast Marketing Area, Mailbox Prices).
Essentially, the mailbox price includes a wide number of additional payments that are not
calculated within the blend price, but it is more representative of what is truly received by
producers for milk.

Additionally, mailbox prices are determined by different regions, and these regions do
not align with federal milk marketing order regional boundaries. Figure 9 is a
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representation of the current federal milk marketing orders and Figure 10 depicts areas on
which mailbox prices are reported. While the regions are remarkably similar, there are
some areas where the differences are significant. Some mailbox price regions are a state
such as Minnesota and Wisconsin (which are both a part of the Upper Midwest Order)
and New York (which is within the Northeast Order’s boundaries). The Southeast
mailbox price, for example, includes the states: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana,
and Mississippi. However, the Southeast marketing order’s region includes parts of
Tennessee, Kentucky, and southern Missouri.
.

Figure 9. Map of Federal Milk Marketing Orders
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Figure 10. July 2016 Mailbox Prices (Hoard's Dairyman, Mailbox Prices; USDAAMS, Mailbox Milk Prices)

The pricing of milk can be complicated with the different kinds of prices, the range of
prices across FMMOs, and the various regulations that affect the amount of milk
regulated under an order. However, these differences are put in place to benefit both
producers and processors within an order’s regional boundaries. This publication
explained how the federal milk marketing orders developed into their current state and
summarized how milk prices are determined via those milk marketing orders. The goal
was to make the complicated nature of the regulation of milk a little less complicated.
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Chapter 3: The Unique Qualities of the Southern Milk Marketing Orders
Milk is a heavily regulated commodity, and therefore there are a large number of rules
that pertain to its production and processing. These regulations are enforced within
regional boundaries called federal milk marketing orders. Most milk marketing orders
have similar rules, but the Appalachian, Florida, and Southeast Orders are somewhat
unique when it comes to diversion limits, transportation credits, and delivery day
requirements. This chapter will highlight these distinctive qualities of Southern milk
marketing orders and how those qualities can influence production and processing in
those orders. A glossary is at the end for reference (Appendix 2).

3.1 Diversion Limits
Every Federal Milk Marketing Order (FMMO), out of the current 10, has diversion
limits. These diversion limits are explained within each federal milk marketing order’s
language (USDA-AMS Historical Documents). Each order is a little different, so these
documents outline the definitions and details used to regulate the order. This language
and any changes in the order language are voted on by producers through a referendum.
In order to pass a referendum “either two-thirds of the dairy farmers voting or producers
representing two-thirds of the milk that would have been pooled during a designated
month must approve” the change (USDA-AMS, Questions and Answers on a Potential
Proposal for a California Federal Milk Marketing Order, 2015). Due to many milk
producers being members of dairy cooperatives, these votes are often cast within a bloc
vote. A bloc vote allows the co-op to vote for all of its members at once.
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Diversion limits are the maximum amount of pooled milk that a pool plant can divert to a
non-pool plant. These diversion limits vary by order and range from as high as 90% to as
low as 10%. In Figure 11, the definitions of the pool and non-pool plants are detailed.
Out of the total amount of milk that is gathered (or pooled) by plants regulated under a
specific order (pool plants) only a certain percentage of that milk can be diverted to a
plant that is not regulated by that order (non-pool plant). A pool plant is regulated under a
federal milk marketing order, while a non-pool plant can be regulated under an order, but
can receive diverted milk from other orders that classify the plant as non-pool. As an
example, a plant that is regulated in the Appalachian Order but also receives diversions
from the Southeast Order would be considered an Appalachian Order pool plant, but a
Southeast Order non-pool plant.

What is a pool plant?
A pool plant is a fully regulated plant that is:
5. A distributing plant
6. A supply plant
7. A plant within the marketing area
operated by a coop
8. Two or more plants operated by the
same handler and within the same
marketing area
What is a non-pool plant?
A non-pool plant is a plant that is:
6. Fully regulated by another Federal
order
7. Producer-handler plant
8. Partially regulated distributing plant
9. Unregulated supply plant
10. An exempt plant
(Federal Order language)
*Please refer to glossary for full definition.
Figure 11. Plant Definitions
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The percentage of milk that can be diverted seems to coordinate closely with how much
milk is produced or available within a milk marketing order’s boundaries. The Upper
Midwest Order, for example, has the highest diversion limits with 90% of their pooled
milk being able to be diverted. This order also has a large number of big dairy farms and
produces a larger amount of milk. Due to their high production levels, they often have
excess milk that needs to be processed, and plants have practical limits on the amount
that they can handle. The large diversion limit allows the excess milk that plants within
the order cannot process to be taken to another plant that is not regulated by the order.
When this milk is diverted, producers are still able to receive the same price as if their
milk had been processed at a plant regulated by their order as long as the percentage of
milk diverted stays within the diversion limits.

However, not all orders have excess milk within their regional boundaries. The Southern
orders – Appalachian, Southeast, and Florida orders – do not have excess milk, and their
orders would be labeled as milk deficit. Their milk deficit status means that they have
much lower diversion limits than the Upper Midwest Order. The Appalachian and
Southeast orders have diversion limits of 25% and 35% depending on the month, and the
Florida order has even lower diversion limits at 10%, 15%, and 20% depending on the
month.

Lower diversion limits support Class I utilization by preventing excess milk from being
processed as a lower class. The southern milk marketing orders have a high number of
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fluid milk (Class I) processing plants. With the low diversion limits preventing a high
percentage of surplus milk from being processed as Class II, III, or IV the blend price is
also supported, compared to other orders. Ideally, the higher the Class I utilization
percentage, the higher the uniform (or blend) 2 price for that order, which further means
that the milk producers within the Appalachian, Florida, or Southeast orders should
receive a higher price for their milk per hundredweight. However, there are two different
types of pricing within the milk marketing orders. There is multiple component pricing
and skim-fat pricing. Skim-fat pricing is based on skim milk and butterfat pounds, while
multiple component pricing is based on skim milk, butterfat, protein, nonfat solids, and
other solids pounds. A 2014 study analyzed how multiple component pricing would
affect the Southern milk marketing orders (Newton, 2014). For the Appalachian and
Southeast Orders there would be an increase in money received, but a decrease for the
Florida Order.

Figure 12 and 13 below shows the mailbox prices for July 2016 and September 2016,
respectively, which display that even though the Southern milk marketing orders have the
highest Class I utilization out of the 10 orders, they do not consistently receive the
highest mailbox price. Since mailbox prices include over-order premiums, an assumption
could be made that regions such as New England or Wisconsin have farms that are
producing large quantities of milk during the summer when supply often goes down that
are earning them a milk price higher than their order’s uniform price.

The uniform price and blend price are the same and will be used interchangeably within
this chapter.
2
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Figure 12. July 2016 Mailbox Prices (Hoard's Dairyman, Mailbox Prices; USDA-AMS,
Mailbox Milk Prices)

Figure 13. September 2016 Mailbox Prices (Hoard's Dairyman, Mailbox Prices; USDAAMS, Mailbox Milk Prices)
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Diversion limits have the potential to benefit both producers and processors, but their
impact on producers in milk-deficit areas has been subject to much debate. For producers
in milk-surplus areas, diversions are helpful because they allow those producers within
the regional boundaries to receive a potentially higher price than if they had to transport
their milk to another order.

The diversion limits also benefit the milk processors by allowing them to have a
“cushion” in their milk supply. Processors need to acquire a certain amount of milk to
meet their demand. For processors to successfully meet that demand, they have to obtain
more milk than what they plan to process. One reason for this is because milk that is
brought in to be processed has to be tested for antibiotics. If a truck comes in that tests
positive for antibiotics that milk will have to be turned away and discarded or used for a
different purpose. The diversion limits allow processors and cooperatives to plan and
prepare for the amount of milk that could arrive and test positive for antibiotics.
However, an FDA study showed that less than 1% of milk tests positive for antibiotics
though (FDA, 2015). Another reason for diversion limits is that they also help provide a
supply cushion in case a producer is not able to produce as much milk as they have in the
past or are contracted to produce. However, in orders like the south where milk supply is
not as high, higher diversion limits negatively impact the price that producers receive for
the milk they produce as a portion of this milk is diverted to lower classes. The
attractiveness or unattractiveness of diversion limits depends on an orders milk supply
market and the type of plants located within the order (Cotterill, 2005).
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3.2 Transportation Credits
Along with diversion limits, transportation credits are another distinctive trait of the
Appalachian and Southeast Orders. The Appalachian, Florida, and Southeast Orders are
unique in their milk deficit status. Each order’s inability to produce enough milk for the
processor’s demand within each of their regions causes cooperatives and processors to
have to look elsewhere for milk in order to obtain enough each month for their demands.
The need to procure milk from outside the order creates an added transportation expense
for milk processors. Due to the milk deficit status of both the Appalachian and Southeast
Orders, transportation credits have been implemented within each order. The
Appalachian and Southeast Orders are the only orders out of the 10 that have
transportation credits, at the time this publication was written (USDA-AMS, A Primer on
Federal Order Transportation Credits, 2010).

So where does the money come from to pay for the transportation credits? Dairy
processors and milk handlers pay a set amount each month based on how much Class I
milk they receive or handle. This monthly payment goes into what is called a
“transportation credit balancing fund” or what is also referred to as TCBF. Milk
processors can then request payment from the TCBF during the months of January,
February, and then July through December. These transportation credits provide another
incentive for processors to bring outside milk into the southern regions. However, there
are two stipulations to request money from the TCBF. A transportation credit primer that
was developed to help explain transportation credits details these stipulations:
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“In addition, bulk milk eligible to receive payment from the TCBF must…
1. Come from dairy farmers whose milk was not pooled on that order for more than

45 days during the immediately preceding months of March through May,
2. Or from farmers with not more than 50 percent of their total production pooled on

that order in those three months. (USDA-AMS, A Primer on Federal Order
Transportation Credits, 2010).”

The current monthly assessment rates for the Appalachian and Southeast Orders are
$0.15 and $0.30, respectively. The transportation credit monthly rates have varied in the
past since when the fund was established in 1996.

3.3 Delivery Day Requirements
The third unique quality of the Southern orders are delivery day requirements. Delivery
day requirements are a number of days out of a month that a producer has to deliver their
milk to an order to be able to have their milk pooled in that order. Most orders have a
delivery day requirement of one day, including the Appalachian and Southeast Orders.
However, Florida is an exception because they have a ten-day delivery requirement. This
means that a producer has to have their milk delivered to Florida ten days out of the
month to have their milk pooled on the Florida Order.

Since Florida has high Class I utilization, the delivery day requirements are good for milk
producers within the order by discouraging excess milk. On the other hand, the ten-day
delivery requirement could be good for plants within Florida’s regional boundaries since
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it potentially could ensure they have enough supply. Florida has a very high uniform
price thanks to their high Class I utilization, and this can attract milk from outside of the
order, but producers or cooperatives who want to receive Florida’s high uniform price
have to make a commitment to the pool plants for a longer period.

3.4 The Florida Order
Florida is a very different order than the other nine milk marketing orders. The main
differences are a high (if not, the highest average) Class I utilization percentage,
extremely low diversion limits, and ten-day delivery day requirements. Florida is also
different because of its geographical borders, except a small area in the Western
Panhandle, is simply the state of Florida. All the other milk marketing orders are
comprised of multiple states. Florida has the highest Class I differentials in the country,
in addition to its high Class I utilization levels. The result is that producers receive higher
milk prices in Florida than the other orders. Due to their uniqueness, Florida is an
excellent example to consider when exploring whether lower diversion limits are an
efficient way to handle the Appalachian and Southeast Orders increasing milk deficit
status.

While milk production in the Southeast Order has been decreasing, the Florida Order’s
production has been able to stay relatively constant ranging between 2,127 and 2,536
million pounds over the past 21 years from 1990 and 2011. At the same time, the
Southeast’s milk production has decreased from 14,440 million pounds in 1980 to 9,096
in 2011 (Covington, 2012).
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Figure 14. Pooled Milk and Plants in Florida and Southeast Orders (USDA-AMS, Florida
and Southeast Marketing Areas, Statistical Reports)

Florida has a few pool plants compared to the other orders. Between 2000 & 2015 the
Florida Order, Order 6, has decreased from 12 pool plants to 10 pool plants. The Upper
Midwest Order, Order 30, had as many as 66 pool plants in 2014 and the Southeast
Order, Order 7, had 22 pool plants in 2015. The small number of pool plants coincides
with the lower amount of milk that is pooled on Order 6. It is also interesting that the
number of cooperatives operating as pool handlers in Florida increased from 2 in 2000 to
7 in 2013 and then 6 in 2015. This shows that it is possible for cooperatives to process
and obtain enough milk for pool plants to meet their demand despite low diversion limits.
The amount of pooled milk and number of plants in the Florida and Southeast Order can
be viewed in Figure 14.
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In 2000, the Florida diversion limits alternated between 20%, 25%, and 40%. Starting in
November 2001 the diversion limits were lowered to 10%, 15%, and 20%. The diversion
limits vary seasonally based on supply and demand. The months of July through
November have a diversion limit of 10%, December through February are 15%, and
March through June are 20%. The lowest diversion limit of 10% signals that demand
could either be lower or supply could be higher during those months. A higher diversion
limit of 20% could be because supply is low or demand is high meaning that processors
need to secure a larger amount of milk.

Florida lowered their diversion limits after a request from a cooperative that marketed a
majority of the Florida Order’s milk. The request came before the market administrator,
and an investigation was conducted. The market administrator’s investigation concluded
that financial damage could occur to milk producers who regularly supply plants that are
regulated on the Florida Order (USDA-AMS, Notice of Decision to Revise Diversion
Percentage Limits, 2001). This financial damage could occur because of an excess
amount of milk being pooled that is “not needed to meet the fluid demands of the market
(USDA-AMS, Notice of Decision to Revise Diversion Percentage Limits, 2001).” The
market administrator did not discuss what the details of the financial damage could be.
However, the memo that announced the decreased diversion limits as a result of the
request mentioned that the cooperative that made the request supplied 97 percent of the
milk on the Florida Order.
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3.5 Florida Compared to the Appalachian and Southeast Orders
The Florida Order has some similarities to the Appalachian and Southeast Orders. All
three orders suffer from milk deficits and have lower diversion limits than the rest of the
milk marketing orders. While there have been requests to lower the diversion limits on
the Southeast Order, the most recent request was to lower the limit to 0%, which is not a
feasible percentage, and was denied (USDA-AMS, Florida and Southeast Marketing
Areas, Combined Comments, 2014). Part of the discussion with changing/lowering the
diversion limits for Orders 5 and 7 is whether lowering the diversion limits is a feasible
task that would not hinder supply and demand within the regional boundaries. While the
Florida Order is not the same in all aspects as the Appalachian and Southeast Orders,
Order 6 does show that it is possible to have lower diversion limits and still meet
processors demand, while at the same time providing a “cushion” to make sure plants can
obtain enough milk to process.

Comparing the Florida Order with the Appalachian and Southeast Orders we see lower
diversion limits, higher delivery day requirements, and a much smaller regional
boundary. The Florida Order has been able to maintain relatively stable milk production
over the past 15 years. There has also been a decrease in pool plants, though there has
been an increase in cooperative-handler plants. While Florida’s low diversion limits and
extremely high delivery day requirements have not been statistically proven to be the
reason for Florida being a successful order – it is still milk deficit – the state has been
able to maintain production over the years. The high delivery day requirements can be
assumed to help the plants with the low diversion limits by ensuring a commitment is
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made on the producer’s side to guarantee at least ten days of milk to the order. These
tools could have implications for the Appalachian and Southeast Orders to potentially
modify their marketing orders in the future.
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Chapter 4: What Evidence Is There That Diversions And Transportation Credits Impact
The Uniform Price for Order 7?

A dairy producer within the Southeast Order submitted a request to the Order 7 market
administrator in 2014 for the diversion limits in the Southeast Order to be lowered to 0%.
The dairy farmer wrote on behalf of himself and other dairy farmers within the order that
they believed certain provisions were creating “inefficient handling of milk and result in
disorderly marketing” (USDA-AMS, Robey Diversions Request, 2014). The request
asked for diversion limits to be lowered to 0% for the months July, August, September,
October, and November of 2014. The letter also mentioned that the dairy farmers of the
Southeast Order “believe this is an emergency” (USDA-AMS, Robey Diversions
Request, 2014). After an open period to receive comments on the request and holding
several listening sessions, the market administrator, Patrick Clark, denied the request
citing that the decision would be disruptive and could have unintended consequences
(USDA-AMS, Diversion Limit Decision, 2014).

The Southeast Order currently allows diversions up to 25% during the months of January,
February, and July through November and 35% for months December and March through
June. The diversion limits are lower than a majority of the ten other FMMOs. The
Appalachian Order has the same diversion limits as the Southeast Order, and the Florida
Order has the lowest diversion limits of all. These low diversion limits help the order
cope with being “milk deficit” markets. Along with diversion limits, the Appalachian and
Southeast Orders have transportation credits to help subsidize transportation costs for
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processors and handlers. Milk pooled on Order 7 that is from farms within the Southeast
Order has been on a downward trend since 2000 but has remained relatively stable since
2012 as can be seen in Figure 15.
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Figure 15. Milk Pooled On Order 7 (USDA-AMS, Florida and Southeast Marketing
Areas, Market Administrator)

The amount of literature that focuses on analyzing federal milk marketing order diversion
limits is scarce, if not nonexistent. This could have many explanations, but part of the
reasoning is due to the amount of data that is publically available via each federal order.
While there is standard information provided by the market administrators, there is also a
wide amount of information that varies per order making it not only difficult to compare,
but also difficult to assemble. Order 7, for instance, publishes detailed information on
diversions and transfers for each class going back to 2000. Order 5, however, has only
published that information since 2014. The study provides an initial analysis of the
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procured data and a framework for investigating the implications of diversions and
transportation credits.

Dairy farmers within the Southeast Order believe that the issue of diversions needs to be
addressed and this is an emergency in their point of view. This study will help dairy
farmers within the Southeast Order, and potentially other Southern orders, gauge the
impact that both diversions and transportation credits are having on their milk price. The
objective of this research is to quantify the effect of diverted pounds and a number of
dollars paid out for transportation credits on Order 7’s uniform price.

4.1 Methodology
Panel data is used for a number of reasons. The ability to utilize the time series
component of data along with studying cross-sectional variables allows research studies
to maximize their analysis. In the case of this research study there is no research to use as
a background, and because of this, there is a chance that variables could be omitted.
Using panel data helps solve the potential omitted variable problem. Woolridge (2002)
states that using panel data will help “to obtain consistent estimators in the presence of
omitted variables.” Using panel data analysis enables the potential omitted variables to be
held constant, as its own variable, to obtain the partial effects of the observed explanatory
variables. Woolridge follows Chamberlain’s (1984) example of using c to demonstrate
the unobserved variable, where written in error form we see:

𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 𝛽𝛽 + 𝑐𝑐 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡
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Where y is the dependent variable, 𝛽𝛽0 is the intercept, 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 𝛽𝛽 is the explanatory variables, 𝑐𝑐
is the unobserved explanatory variables, and 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 is the error term. By assuming that c is
time constant, using multiple years of data and differencing the equations allows the

time-constant c to be eliminated. The differencing of equations can also be referred to as
within-group estimation or fixed effects estimator.

Arellano (2003) discusses two primary assumptions for a static fixed effect model,

′
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝛽𝛽 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

Arellano uses 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 as the unobserved variable and 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 as the error term in this example.
This first assumption is that the error term is not correlated to the observed and
unobserved explanatory variables,

Ε(𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 |𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 ) = 0 (𝑡𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇𝑇)
Another way of looking at this assumption is that the error term “at any period is
uncorrelated with the past, present, and future values of x (Arellano, 2003).”

The second assumption is that “the errors are conditionally homoskedastic and not
serially correlated,
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 |𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 ) = 𝜎𝜎 2 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡
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Assumption 1, however, can be weakened to:

Ε(𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 |𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ) = 0 (𝑡𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇𝑇)
And this assumption will be more often used for convenience, according to Arellano
(2003), “since many results of interest can be obtained with it.”

While work in the dairy sector on the impact of diversions and transportation credits is
scarce, there is a significant amount of research that uses panel data. Most panel data
research that focuses on dairy involves consumer demand or technical efficiency. In
1996, Ahmad and Bravo-Ureta used panel data to examine “the impact of fixed effects
production functions vis-a-vis stochastic production frontiers on technical efficiency
measures.” The study looked at Vermont dairy farmers over a 14-year period and found
the fixed effects technique to be superior, but overall their efficiency analysis was
consistent with both models (Ahmad & Bravo-Ureta, 1996). Using Nielsen Homescan
data, Copeland and Dharmasena (2016) were able to analyze the impact of rising demand
for dairy alternative beverages on dairy farmers. Using a tobit econometric procedure it
was found that white milk was a substitute for soymilk and almond milk, and people who
buy white milk treat almond milk as a complement (Copeland & Dharmasena, 2016). Seo
and McCarl (2014) look at how transportation costs, supply, and demand, along with
seasonality can affect Class I milk price differentials using a random effects approach.
The research found that changes in transportation costs or supply/demand are significant
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and can cause an increase in Class I differentials. Seo and McCarl’s (2014) research also
found that transportation credits were having their intended effect of moving milk from
low utilization areas to high utilization areas. Foltz (2004) uses panel data to develop a
model analyzing the factors that lead to dairy farms exiting the industry under the New
England Dairy Compact. This analysis specified a random effects probit model and an
autocorrelated generalized least squares model and found that the price supports enacted
by the Dairy Compact helped to reduce the number of dairy farms exiting the industry for
the area.

Fixed Effects Models
Time has been found to be an important component of dairy research. Due to time being
such an important factor this model uses panel data to analyze both the time series
element and the cross-sectional standpoint.

The Southeast Order’s uniform price was specified in two linear regression equations.
The first model focuses on the effect of diversions:

𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙3𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

+ 𝛽𝛽3 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙4𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽6 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

The 𝑖𝑖 in this equation indexes the twelve months in a year for the years 2007 through

2015 and is the time series factor of this model. The cross-sectional units for this model
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are: Class II, Class III, and Class IV are the pounds of milk diverted for Class II, III, and
IV each month, respectively, Class3 is the announced Class III price for each month,
KYCorn is the price paid for Kentucky corn, and Milk Sales is the estimated amount of
fluid milk sold in the United States each month.

The second model focuses on the impact of transportation credits. Seo and McCarl (2014)
determined that an increase in transportation costs can cause an increase in Class I
differentials, and transportation credits helped to milk move from low to high utilization
markets. This can be viewed as the effect of transportation on consumers by moving milk
to milk deficit areas, and the following regression focuses on the effect of transportation
credits on producers:

𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
As with the first equation, the 𝑡𝑡 in this equation indexes the twelve months in each year

for 2007 to 2015 and is the time series unit. Within the second model the cross-sectional
units are: TC is the amount of money that is paid out each month for transportation
credits, and Class3, KYCorn, and Milk Sales are the same as with the first model.

48

4.2 Data
The original intent was for the data set to range from years 2000 to 2015. However, due
to proprietary reasons, the pounds of diverted milk could only be provided for years 2007
to 2015. The data is monthly from January 2007 to December 2015 for a total of 108
observations. All of the variables that are represented in the results have the natural log
taken of them.
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VARIABLE

DESCRIPTION

UNIT
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overall
The monthly blend price that is the
LNUNIF7
lowest amount pooled producers $/cwt between
can receive for milk per cwt.
within
overall
The pounds of milk diverted into
LNC2DIV
lbs
between
Class II that are pooled on Order 7
within
overall
The pounds of milk diverted into
LNC3DIV
Class III that are pooled on Order
lbs
between
7
within
overall
The pounds of milk diverted into
Class IV that are pooled on Order
LNC4DIV
lbs
between
7
within
overall
The advanced price which is
LNC3
calculated using the USDA's
$/cwt between
Current Price Formulas
within
overall
The amount per bushel received
LNKY
$/bu between
for corn in the state of Kentucky
within
overall
Mil
The estimated U.S. sales of fluid
LNSALES
$/Cw between
milk per month
t
within
The amount of dollars paid to
overall
processors/handlers each month
between
LNTCDO~S
$$
that qualified for transportation
within
credits
Figure 16. Descriptive Statistics for Fixed Effects Models

MEAN
2.99

16.58

17.43

16.85

2.81

1.56

8.39

14.17

STD.
DEV.
0.1796
0.0498
0.1731
0.6268
0.2962
0.5583
0.6042
0.2995
0.5311
0.7031
0.5453
0.4683
0.2061
0.0480
0.2008
0.2469
0.0524
0.2417
0.0620
0.0446
0.0446
0.3492
0.2909

MIN

MAX

2.523
2.920
2.545
14.06
16.08
14.45
16.20
16.97
16.28
14.66
15.86
15.60
2.231
2.746
2.282
1.137
1.477
1.176
8.190
8.312
8.259
13.55
13.86

3.327
3.053
3.350
17.58
17.03
17.65
18.73
17.84
18.61
17.96
17.50
18.14
3.202
2.877
3.234
1.986
1.631
2.016
8.497
8.455
8.459
15.01
14.79

0.2041

13.50

14.62

OBS.
N=
n=
T=
N=
n=
T=
N=
n=
T=
N=
n=
T=
N=
n=
T=
N=
n=
T=
N=
n=
T=
N=
n=

108
12
9
108
12
9
108
12
9
108
12
9
108
12
9
108
12
9
108
12
9
74
9

T = 8.22

SOURCE
UW (2016)

Mkt. Admin

Mkt. Admin

Mkt. Admin

UW (2016)

UW (2016)

USDA-ERS

Mkt. Admin

The objective of the two models is to determine the effect of diverted pounds and
transportation credits on the uniform price, therefore within this analysis, the dependent
variable for both models is the uniform price for Order 7. The uniform price, which can
also be referenced as the blend price, is the minimum price that producers can receive for
their milk if they pool their milk on Order 7. It is the weighted average of the skim milk
and butterfat pounds for each of the four classes. The mailbox price was another potential
option to be the dependent variable. However, the mailbox price is determined by region
rather than milk marketing order, and there are other factors within the mailbox price that
would have been difficult to separate for this research.

Milk is a heavily regulated commodity, and because of this, there is a significant amount
of publically available data via USDA’s Economic Research Service (ERS). Websites
such as the University of Wisconsin’s Understanding Dairy Markets allow a plethora of
milk-related data to be located in one area, which allowed for easy gathering data. As
mentioned earlier, the only difficult data to gather was the order specific data that needed
to be specially requested from the Order 7 market administrator.

For the first model, the independent variables are: Class II, III, and IV diverted pounds of
milk, Class III price, the price received for Kentucky corn, and the estimated U.S. sales of
fluid milk. Milk that is diverted can be diverted into any class out of the four. Since Order
7 has a high Class I utilization rate then milk that is diverted to Class I is unlikely to
cause a decrease in the uniform price or a change in Class I utilization. However, milk
that is diverted into Class II, III, or IV can decrease the uniform price. This is why the
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number of pounds of milk diverted into these classes other than Class I are used in the
first model. Additionally, a certain class could have more milk diverted into it on a
regular basis. For this reason, each class was included to gauge its potential impact on the
uniform price. The pounds of diverted milk were requested, and received, directly from
the market administrator as they were not publically available via the Order 7 website.

The Class III price has a strong correlation with the U.S. milk price and fluid milk price
(Bolotova & Novakovic, 2014; Bozic & Fortenberry, 2010). While the fluid milk price
specifically refers to Class I milk, Order 7 has a high Class I utilization and because Class
III price is correlated with the fluid milk price the advanced Class III milk price was
included. Additionally, the advanced Class III skim milk price is directly calculated into
the Class I price in months when it exceeds the advanced Class IV price. As mentioned
earlier, the Understanding Dairy Markets website has a large collection of data located in
one place, and the advanced Class III price was gathered from this site.

The Kentucky feed price was included in this analysis as a control for feed prices. Feed
prices can have an impact on milk prices through milk production. As corn price rises,
producers are forced to consider alternative feedstuffs, which in turn influences milk
production. Chavas, Kraus, and Jesse (1990) showed that feed prices could affect
different regions differently. Their 1990 study found that the ‘East South Central’ region
– Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi – experienced higher milk production
during high feed costs (Chavas, Kraus, Jesse, 1990). The variable was taken from the
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Understanding Milk Markets website as well who pulled it from USDA’s National
Agricultural Statistics Service Agricultural Prices.

The estimated U.S. sales of fluid milk were derived from the Understanding Milk
Markets website. The Understanding Milk Markets website pulled the sales information
from the Estimated Fluid Milk Products Sales Report that is published by USDA-AMS. It
has been mentioned many times that Order 7 has a high Class I utilization, but sales of
fluid milk have been decreasing since around 2010. The decreasing sales of fluid milk
can be hypothesized to have an effect on Class I utilization and therefore could have an
effect on Order 7’s uniform price. For this reason and because this variable can be
thought of like a milk supply measure, the estimated U.S. sales of fluid milk were
included in this model.

The second model contains several of the same explanatory variables, but there are four
total independent variables: the amount of transportation credits paid (the number of
dollars that went out to handlers/processors), the Class III price, the price received for
Kentucky corn, and the estimated amount of fluid milk sales. The only new variable
within the second model is the transportation credits information. A processor/handler
has to apply for and claim transportation credits, and then based on the qualifications of
the milk the processor/handler is claiming, the processor/handler is paid accordingly. The
amount that is paid to processor/handlers for transportation credits is the explanatory
variable in the second model. This data was gathered from the Order 7’s website. Within
each annual statistical report, there is information related to how many dollars were
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claimed for transportation credits and how many dollars were paid for transportation
credits.

4.3 Results
The first fixed effects model quantifies the effect of Class II, III, and IV diversions on
Order 7’s uniform price. The Breusch Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test was the first test
run on the first model. This test failed to reject the null hypothesis, therefore, concluding
that there were no significant differences between the months and that random effects are
not an appropriate method for this model. The Hausman test showed that fixed effects
were the appropriate method since the null hypothesis (random effects model is
preferred) was rejected. To decrease the potential for heteroscedasticity since the
variables used varied in units – the pounds of milk are in millions and prices of milk are
dollars per hundredweight – the natural log of each variable was taken. However, there
were still traces of heteroscedasticity in the model, so the “robust” option was used to
control for heteroscedasticity by obtaining robust standard errors. From Table 5 below it
can be seen that there were two significant variables out of a total of six explanatory
variables. Both the Class II diversions and the Class III price are significant at the 1%
level (p<.01).

55

R2
within 0.9133
between 0.7457
overall 0.9006

Obs.
Groups

corr(u_i, xb) -0.0590
variables

coefficient

108
12

f(6,11)
prob > f
robust st.
error
1.750
0.007
0.016
0.016
0.035
0.025
0.231

407.39
0.0000

p>|t|

Intercept 4.3233**
0.031
Class II div -0.0236***
0.009
Class III div -0.0007
0.966
Class IV div -0.0130
0.426
Class III .7759***
0.000
KY corn .0123
0.636
Fluid milk sales -.3470
0.161
Sigma_u 0.0257
Sigma_e 0.0556
Rho 0.1766
*** 0.01% significance, ** 0 .05% significance, * 0.10% significance
Table 5. Diversions Fixed Effects Model Results

Out of the three classes of diversions, only Class II diversions had a statistical
significance on Order 7’s uniform price. This finding of diversions having a negative
impact on uniform price was expected. The model shows that ceteris paribus, a 1%
increase in Class II diversions will have a .0236% decrease on Order 7’s uniform price.
This effect is small and could amount to pennies on the uniform price. However, it is
significant which is important to consider. If Class II diversions were to increase 1%,
holding everything else constant – and the uniform price was set at $16.00 – the price
would decrease by $0.0038. A 1% change in diversions wouldn’t be expected to garner a
large amount of change. However, if Class II diversions were to increase by 5% then the
uniform price – once again, set at $16.00 – would decrease by $0.018. The uniform price
would then be $15.98 per hundredweight. Another example is if Class II diversions were
to increase by 10% then, ceteris paribus, the uniform price – set at $16.00 – would
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decrease by $0.038. As can be seen in Tables 6 and 7, the effect of increasing Class II
diversions on a dairy farm are relatively small.

Pounds of Milk Produced

Uniform Price - $16.00
5%

Per cow

60 Cow Farm

17,000

$0.31

$18.6

20,000

$0.36

$21.6

25,000

$0.45

$27.0

30,000

$0.54

$32.4

Table 6. 5% Increase in Class II Diversions

Pounds of Milk Produced

Uniform Price - $16.00
10%

Per cow

60 Cow Farm

17,000

$0.65

$39.0

20,000

$0.76

$45.6

25,000

$0.95

$57.0

30,000

$1.14

$68.4

Table 7. 10% Increase in Class II Diversions

This finding supports the hypothesis that diversions have a negative effect on the uniform
price. The statistical significance of Class II on the uniform price could be because as
Class IV products consumption remains relatively stable and Class III steadily climbs
higher Class II milk is where the excess milk goes making a more significant determinant
of Class I price. The figure below (Figure 17) shows the rise in Class III consumption
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(American and Other cheese as listed in ERS) and the constant usage of Class IV (Butter,
dry whole milk, nonfat dry milk, and dry buttermilk as listed in ERS).

Pounds per person

Consumption of Class III and Class IV products
40.0
35.0
30.0
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0

Class III

Class IV

Figure 17. Class III and IV Consumption (USDA-ERS, Dairy Data 2016)

The Class III and IV diversions also show a negative impact on the uniform price.
However, their impact is not statistically significant. This is not the result that was
expected. Class III, out of the nine years of data, had the most pounds of milk diverted at
over 4,798 million pounds, and Class IV had the second most pounds at over 2,792
million pounds. Since Class III and Class IV had more diverted pounds than Class II,
over 1,979 million pounds, their significance was expected to be more statistically
significant than Class II. Since this was not the case, it could be assumed that while Class
III and IV have large quantities diverted, the amount is more consistent than Class II and
has been for the nine years of data analyzed within this study.
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The variable Class III had a positive impact on Order 7’s uniform price, and this is a
result that would be expected. The model shows that a 1% increase in the advanced Class
III price, ceteris paribus, leads to a .7759% increase in Order 7’s uniform price. For
example, if the advanced Class III price increases by 1% then the uniform price – if set at
$16.00 – would increase by $0.12. The advanced Class III price is a driver of the uniform
price calculation, therefore, the higher the Class III price is then, theoretically, the higher
the uniform price. The advanced Class III price also has a significant impact on Order 7’s
uniform price. This is a result we would expect because Class III is a driver of uniform
price.

Though Kentucky corn shows a positive sign for Order 7’s uniform price the variable is
not statistically significant. The result of not being significant is not what we would
expect, though the positive sign is. The expectation of a positive impact of Kentucky corn
on uniform price is because of the rationale that an increase in feed costs would decrease
milk supply due to farmers changing their feed rations and substituting corn for a
component that is not as nutritional. However, as Wolf (2010) points out “milk supply
does not adjust immediately to changes in feed costs.” The Kentucky corn price and
Order 7’s uniform price do not move consistently, as can be seen in Figure 18, and the
uniform price experienced greater volatility than Kentucky corn.
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Order 7 Uniform Price and Kentucky Corn Price
30
25
Price

20
15
10
5
J07
Ju07
N07
A08
S08
F09
Jy09
D09
Ma10
O10
M11
Au11
J12
Ju12
N12
A13
S13
F14
Jy14
D14
Ma15
O15

0

Uniform Price

KY Corn

Figure 18. Uniform and KY Corn Price (University of Wisconsin Dairy Marketing
and Risk Management Program, Understanding Milk Markets)

The last variable within the first model is the estimated U.S. fluid milk sales. The model
shows that there is a negative effect of estimated U.S. fluid milk sales on the uniform
price. This result is to be expected as well. While not a significant variable, the milk sales
help to represent demand. As demand for fluid milk decreases and milk
supply/production stays constant, the uniform price should fall. The rationale for the
estimated U.S. fluid milk sales having a negative effect on Order 7’s uniform price is
because Order 7 primarily processes fluid milk. The decline of fluid milk sales could
decrease Class I utilization and then have a negative effect on the uniform price.
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R2
within 0.9064
between 0.5771
overall 0.8792

Obs.
Groups

corr(u_i, xb) -0.0957
variables

coefficient

74
9

f(4,8)
prob > f
robust st.
error
2.074
0.022
0.055
0.019
0.0231

383.68
0.0000

p>|t|

Intercept
3.7533
0.108
TC
0.0333
0.166
Class III 0.7766***
0.000
KY corn
-0.0210
0.307
Fluid milk sales
-0.4020
0.120
Sigma_u
0.0351
Sigma_e
0.0557
Rho
0.2845
***0.01% significance, ** 0.05% significance, * 0.10% significance
Table 8. Transportation Credits Fixed Effects Model Results (w/sales)

The second fixed effects model analyzes the effect of money paid towards transportation
credits on the uniform price for Order 7. The second model went through the same tests
as the first model as well as the natural log being taken for each variable within the
model. While the second model did not have an issue with heteroscedasticity, the
“robust” option was still used. This second model, which can be viewed above in Table
8, showed that only one variable, the advanced Class III price, has a statistically
significant impact on Order 7’s uniform price. This significant variable is consistent with
the first model. The results of this model, though, could be skewed by a smaller set of
observations. Transportation credits are only paid out during certain months of the year,
meaning that during certain months $0 were requested and paid. Because of this, the
number of observations went from 108 (the number of observations in the first model) to
74.
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The first variable, the money paid for transportation credits, is shown to have a positive
impact on uniform price. However, the transportation credits do not have a statistically
significant impact on Order 7’s uniform price. The expectation was for transportation
credits to have a negative effect on Order 7’s uniform price. However, as mentioned
earlier, a small number of observations could have a biased effect on the model.

The Class III variable is consistent with the first model. The advanced Class III price has
a positive effect on Order 7’s uniform price and is statistically significant. Additionally,
the Class III price impact in the second model (0.7766) is almost the same as the first
model (0.7759). The advanced Class III price shows that a 1% increase in the Class III
price will, ceteris paribus, have a 0.7766% increase in Order 7’s uniform price.

The Kentucky corn price within this second model shows a negative effect on Order 7’s
uniform price and is not statistically significant. While the Kentucky corn price was not
significant in the first model, it had a positive impact on the uniform price. This could be
due to the decrease in some observations because of the months that transportation credits
can be requested. The months that the transportation credits were paid out for Order 7
could coincide with certain months (seasons) that the Kentucky corn price increases
while the uniform price decreases or, where the corn price decreases while the uniform
price increases. The transportation credits are available during months that local supply is
determined not to be able to meet demand. However, as can be seen below in Figure 19,
the uniform price for Order 7 has been volatile and unpredictable seasonally. In 2012,
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the uniform price steadily rose from June to November, but in 2011 the price dropped
from August to December.

$/cwt
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Figure 19. Yearly Prices By Month for Order 7 Uniform Price (USDA-AMS, Florida and
Southeast Marketing Areas)

Within this second model, fluid milk sales are consistent with the first model. Both
results are shown to have a negative effect on uniform price but are not statistically
significant. This impact is what would be expected, though, because of high the Class I
utilization is within Order 7 it would also be expected to be statistically significant.
Interestingly, when estimated U.S. fluid milk sales are dropped from the transportation
credits model (as can be seen in Table 7), the R2 for between group rises from 0.5771 or
almost 58% of the model explained to 0.8660, or almost 87%, of the model, explained
between groups. Additionally, the overall R2 rises from .8792, almost 88%, to .8941,
roughly 89% of the overall model is explained.
63

R2
within 0.8975
between 0.8660
overall 0.8941

Obs.
Groups

corr(u_i, xb) -0.0669

74
9

f(3,8)
prob > f

228.03
0.0000

Robust
p>|t|
st. error
Intercept
0.5066
0.349
0.186
TC
0.0187
0.034
0.585
Class III 0.8010***
0.037
0.000
KY corn
-0.0291
0.030
0.341
***0.01% significance, **0.05% significance, *0.10% significance
Table 9. Transportation Credits Fixed Effects Model Results (w/o sales)
variables

coefficient

4.4 Conclusion
This study addressed the effect of lower class diversions and transportation credits on the
Southeast Order’s uniform price. Two fixed effects models were estimated to quantify the
effects of diversions and transportation credits on Order 7’s uniform price. The first
model’s analysis showed that out of the three lower class diversions only Class II had a
statistically significant impact. The second model that quantified transportation credits
impact on uniform price showed there was no statistically significant impact of the
money paid out for transportation credits on Order 7’s uniform price.

The policy implications of this study are that diversions could be further looked into to
ensure that both producers and processors/handlers are being fairly treated with the
Southeast milk marketing order. This study showed the Class II diversions have a
significant impact on Order 7’s uniform price, and while that impact is small, it is still
important to consider. However, the impact of transportation credits on the uniform price
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is statistically nonexistent meaning that transportation credits are having the intended
effect of moving milk from low utilization areas to high utilization and are not having a
negative impact on producers within the Southeast Order.

There were some limitations with this study. The main limitation was the lack of research
investigating the effects of diversions and transportation credits on the federal milk
marketing orders. The topic has come up within orders before such as requests to lower
the diversion limit, but depending on the milk production level of pooled producers the
responses have varied. Due to this limitation of limited research, the ability to draw from
previous studies and build upon this area was not possible. However, this limitation did
open up the door for this area to begin being looked at more in-depth.

With the lack of research, a second limitation is the lack of publicly available data. The
market administrators for both Order 5 and Order 7 were very helpful at putting together
each data requests that was submitted. Unfortunately, due to concerns about releasing
proprietary information, regarding diverted pounds of milk, the data set was limited to the
years 2007 to 2015 instead of the desired 2000 to 2015. In the future, hopefully, milk
marketing order data will be more easily accessible online or through a different
database.

This research helps lay the groundwork for more research into the effect of diversions on
milk marketing orders. The effect of diversions could vary by milk marketing order
depending on the milk supply within the order’s boundaries. Since the Appalachian and
Southeast Orders are the only two orders with a transportation credit balancing fund more
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research to compare the effects of transportation credits on each order could be done to
fully understand the effects of the credits on producers. While this study showed there
was no effect on Southeast producers, there could potentially be an effect on Appalachian
producers, since there is a difference in assessment rates between the two orders.
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Chapter 5: Summary
Within this study, a history of the federal milk marketing orders has been presented, a
case study of the southern milk marketing orders, and an analytical look at the effects of
lower class diversions and transportation credits on the Southeast Order’s uniform price.
The federal milk marketing orders have evolved extensively since their implementation
in 1937 under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement. Since that time the regional
boundaries of the marketing orders have grown to the current 10 milk marketing orders
we have.

Three out of the ten orders, the Southern orders, have unique qualities that make them
stand out compared to the other orders. In particular, the Southern orders have low
diversion limits relative to the seven other orders. These diversion limits have been set to
curb the “milk deficit” status that currently describes these orders. Farmers within the
Appalachian and Southeast Orders have been concerned that the diversion limits are set
too high and are negatively affecting their uniform price. A 2014 request to lower
diversion limits to 0% opened the order to comments from both producers and
processors. While a majority of processors were not open to the request of lowering the
(USDA-AMS, Florida and Southeast Marketing Areas, Combined Comments, 2014).
There has also been anecdotal evidence that farmers have been feeling contention
towards transportation credits as well.
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Part of this study addressed farmer concerns by using panel data to analyze the effects of
lower class diversions and transportation credits on Order 7’s uniform price. While the
transportation credits were found to have no effect on the uniform price, Class II
diversions were found to have a negative and statistically significant impact. This finding
suggests that more research should happen to ensure that both producers and processors
are being treated equally within the federal milk marketing system.

The research within this study sets up a foundation for future research on diversions and
transportation credits and discusses results that could have policy implications. Overall,
this study presented an inclusive view of the federal milk marketing system with a special
focus on the southern orders.
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Appendices
Appendix 1:
Glossary
Class I Differentials: A differential that is added to the Class I Skim Milk Price. The
differential is based on location and can range from $0.00 to $4.50.
Class Utilization: The percentage of pooled milk that is processed per class within a
federal milk marketing order
Component Prices: The price of butterfat, protein, nonfat milk solids, and other milk
solids using the product price, make allowance, and yield.
Make Allowance: The estimated manufacturing cost of a component per pound produced.
Mailbox Price: The net price received by dairy farmers at their farm gates. This includes
all payments received for milk sold less the cost associated with marketing the milk
(ERS, 2016).
Diversion Limits: The maximum percentage of pooled milk within a federal milk
marketing order that a pool plant may divert to a non-pool plant.
Uniform (Blend) Price: The minimum price in a federal milk marketing order that a milk
producer can receive if they pool their milk in that order.
Yield Factor: How much one pound of a milk component can produce a certain product.
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Appendix 2
Glossary
Class I Differentials: A differential that is added to the Class I Skim Milk Price. The
differential is based on location and can range from $0.00 to $4.50.
Diversion Limits: The maximum percentage of pooled milk within a federal milk
marketing order that a pool plant may divert to a non-pool plant.
Mailbox Price: The net price received by dairy farmers at their farm gates. This includes
all payments received for milk sold less the cost associated with marketing the milk
(Mark, et al., 2016).
Non-pool Plant: A plant that is fully regulated by another federal order, a producerhandler plant, a partially regulated distributing plant, an unregulated supply plant, or an
exempt plant (USDA-AMS, Order Regulating the handling of Milk in the Southeast
Marketing Area, 2014).
Pool Plant: A fully regulated plant that is either a distributing plant, a supply plant, a
plant within the marketing area operated by a coop, or two or more plants operated by the
same handler and within the same marketing area (USDA-AMS, Order Regulating the
handling of Milk in the Southeast Marketing Area, 2014).
Uniform (Blend) Price: The minimum price in a federal milk marketing order that a milk
producer can receive if they pool their milk on that order.
Transportation Credits: Funds that are gathered into a Transportation Credit Balancing
Fund and can be used to aid plants in bring in milk from out of the order
Delivery Day Requirements: The amount of days a producer or cooperative is required to
deliver milk to a pool plant in order for their milk to be pooled on an order.

70

Appendix 3
Current Milk Pricing Formulas
𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 𝑰𝑰:

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥 0.965) + (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥 3.5).
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
= 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓
+ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑.
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
= 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓
+ (𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 100).

𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰:

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥 0.965) + (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥 3.5).
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + $0.70.
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + $0.007.
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 =

𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰:

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
.
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𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥 0.965) + (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥 3.5).
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥 3.1) + (𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥 5.9).
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = ((𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 – 0.2003) 𝑥𝑥 1.383)
+ ((((𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 – 0.2003) 𝑥𝑥 1.572) – 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥 0.9) 𝑥𝑥 1.17).
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 – 0.1991) 𝑥𝑥 1.03.
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 – 0.1715) 𝑥𝑥 1.211.

𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰:

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥 0.965) + (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥 3.5).
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥 9.
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 − 0.1678) 𝑥𝑥 0.99.
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼.
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